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INTRODUCTION 
-and that 'hows that 
there are three hundred and sixty-four 
days when you might get un-birthday 
p~u-" 
··ccnainly,'' ~id Alice. 
.. And only one for birthday presenu, 
you know. There's glory for your· 
··1 don't know what you mean by 
·glory~' ·· Alice 5aid. 
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptu· 
ously ... Of cour5e you don't-till I tell 
you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down 
argument for youf'" 
"But 'glory' docm't mean ·a nice knock-
down argument,'" Alice objected. 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty 
said, in rather a scornful tone, .. it means 
just what I choose it to mean-neitheT 
more nor less.·· 
"The question is,·· said Alice, "whether 
you can Ill2ke wor~ mean so many differ-
ent things." 
.. The que9tion is,'' aid Humpty 
Dumpty, 11 which is to be master-that's 
all ... 
Alice was too much puzzled to say any· 
thing~ so after a minute Humpty Du!llpty 
began again ... They've a temper, some of 
them-panicularly verbs: they're the 
proudest-adjectiv~ you can do anything 
with. but not verbs-however, I can man· 
age the whole lot of them! Impenetra-
bility I That's what I say!" 
,.Would you tell me, please." said Alice, 
"what that means?" 
"Now you talk like a reasonable child," 
said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much 
pleased. ..I meant by ·impenetrability' 
that we've had enough of that subject, and 
it would be just as well if you'd mention 
what you mean to do next, as I suppose 
you don't mean to stop here all the rest 
of your life." 
"That's a great deal to mile one word 
mean," Alice said in a thoughtful tone. 
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.. When I make a word do a lot 0£ work. 
like that," said Humpty Dumpty, "I al-
• •• ways pay it extra. 
uOhl" said Alice. She was too much 
puzzled to make my other remark.. 
''Ah, you should 54:e ·em come round 
me of a Saturday night," Humpty Dump-
ty went oo, wagging his head gravely 
from side to side, .. for to get their wages, 
you know.·· 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, pp. 268-270, 
3rd . Ed . ( 19 6 8 ) . 
This appeal is solely directed to the meaning of words. 
As is the case in all statutory construction litigation 
what the words of the statute mean and how they are applied 
are the only issues to be decided on appeal. Plaintiff St. 
Benedict's Hospital asserts that the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Corrunission of Utah, like Humpty Dumpty, uses 
words in a manner it chooses it to mean regardless of the 
true meaning of such words. 
The words now in dispute in this appeal are "good cause" 
and "equity and good conscience." The meaning of these two 
phrases is the sole issue in this appeal and Plaintiff will 
therefore reply to the arguments raised by the defendants 
in support of their interpretation of these words. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS 
ERRONEOUS IN THAT IT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IN A MANNER 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the Statement of Facts, 
or the arguments contained in Point I, II and II of Defendants' 
Brief. (Defendants Brief, pp. 2-6). Plaintiff would, however, 
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make several observations. 
First, Plaintiff believes that the record is clear that 
nurse Petersen told Mr. Featherston of the problem she was 
having with her supervisor as is evidenced by the dialogue 
on pages 21 and 22 of the transcript. Since this factual 
dispute is immaterial to this appeal no further comment is 
necessary. 
Second, there is no doubt that the standard of review 
in these types of cases is difficult for the plaintiff to 
sustain. In cases involving an interpretation of facts, 
for example, this Court will almost universally uphold the 
decision of the Board of Review providing there is any evi-
~ 
dence to support its findings. However, when the Board of 
Review has obviously misinterpreted the law as is evidenced 
by its own decision, a reversal is justified. 
Third, Plaintiff agrees that the purpose of the Employ-
ment Security Act is to assist a worker and his family during 
times of unemployment and to help maintain the purchasing 
power of the unemployed person and his family in the economy. 
However, the Legislature has clearly indicated that not all 
unemployed persons, regardless of the purpose of employment 
compensation, are entitled to unlimited benefits merely 
because they are unemployed. The numerous reasons why unemploy-
ment insurance cannot be given to a person as ennunciated in 
-3-
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the statutes show that this legislative intent is carefully 
defined to only those persons who are deemed deserving of 
these benefits. 
Plaintiff vigorously opposes the contentions raised in 
Point IV of Defendants' Brief concerning the correct inter-
pretation of Section 35-4-5(a) of the Employment Security Act. 
(Defendants' Brief, pp. 7-15). As to Point V, Plaintiff will 
not respond into justifying the decision of the Board of 
Review or further reviewing the evidence in that the Board in-
correctly applied an erroneous standard of review and there-
fore detailed arguments as to the justification of this 
standard serve no purpose. 
Plaintiff would also request the Court in considering 
this case review the facts and arguments raised in Case No. 
17922 entitled "Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch." While 
portions of that appeal go beyond the issues raised in this 
appeal, the same contention of misinterpretation of Section 
35-4-5(a) U.C.A. was also raised in that case. In that instance, 
the Board of Review also determined that there was no good 
cause for the Salt Lake City employee to quit her job but 
decided that the decision to resign was reasonable and there-
fore granted the employee full benefits. 
Both parties heretofore have quoted the statute now in 
-4-
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dispute, Section 35-4-S(a). To briefly review, however, 
the statute allows benefits to be paid to an unemployed 
individual if the person left work voluntarily with good 
cause. The statute also provides, however, that no claimant 
shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant leaves work 
under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary 
to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
Finally, the statute seemingly defines equity and good 
conscience as the reasonableness of the claimant's actions 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine con-
tinuing attachment to the labor market. 
The Appeals Referee specifically stated in his Findings 
that the defendant Carol Petersen did not terminate her 
employment with good cause. The Board of Review agreed with 
this conclusion and stated that the reasons given by Mrs. 
Petersen "are not compelling and therefore do not constitute 
good cause.'' (R. 6). The Board, however, held that these 
same reasons were "sufficiently mitigating to give reason to 
the claimant's decision to leave work" and therefore it would 
be a denial of equity and good conscience not to allow benefits. 
The interpretation by the Board of Review on its face 
indicates the existence of two separate standards. First, 
a standard determining whether good cause has been found and 
secondly whether even in the absence of good cause a claimant 
-5-
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can receive benefits since the denial would be against 
equity and good conscience. If, indeed, there were two 
separate standards and two separate sets of criteria to be 
used in determining these two concepts the decision of the 
Board of Review would be supportable. However, there is no 
such double standard and, as elaborated in Plaintiff's Brief 
in chief, the standard for both "good cause" and for "equity 
and good conscience" is identical. This identical stanard 
can be seen as follows: 
The term "good cause" has been defined both by this 
Court and by the regulations of the Industrial Commission 
itself. In Denby v. The Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 626 (Utah 1977) the court noted that a 
claimant must be available for work and must be genuinely 
attached to the labor market. The court further noted that 
"good cause" is a cause which would similarly affect persons 
of reasonable and normal sensitivity and where the pressures 
of the employment are so compelling that a reasonably prudent 
person would be justified in quitting under similar circum-
stances. The court also noted that it was the burden of the 
claimant to prove that good cause existed. See also, Box 
Elder County v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 632 P.2d 839 
(Utah 1981) . 
The Industrial Commission has similarly defined "good 
-6-
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cause" for unemployment benefit purposes as follows: 
"Good cause", as used in the unemployment 
insurance system, is such a cause as justifies 
an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of 
the employed and joining the unemployed; the 
leaving must be for such cause as would reason-
ably motivate in a similar situation the 
average worker to give up employment with its 
wage rewards to become unemployed. The terms 
suggest, as minimum requirements, real circum-
stances, substantial reasons, objective con-
ditions, perceivable forces, adequate excuses 
that will bear the test of reason, just grounds 
for action. To constitute good cause, the 
circumstances which compel the decision to 
leave must be real, not imaginary; substantial, 
not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical. 
There must be some compulsion from some outside 
and necessitous circumstance. The standard of 
what constitutes good cause is the standard of 
reasonableness as applied to the average indi-
vidual and not to the supersensitive. Rule 
A71-07-2:7i(2), Rules of Adjudication, Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 
These definitions clearly show that "good cause" is 
determined by the "reasonableness" of the claimant's actions 
and by his attachment to the labor force. 
The terms "equity and good conscience" as noted in 
Plaintiff's prior Brief are normally defined as conditions 
which have almost unlimited discretion on the part of the 
arbitrator. What is "equitable" or "in good conscience" 
depends upon the reviewer's sense of justice and may easily 
vary from individual to individual. 
The defendants, however, reject this normal standard 
and contend that the Legislature structured the discretion the 
-7-
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Commission may exercise. The defendants argue that the 
statute itself limits the terms of "equity and good conscience" 
by its own definition. (Defendants' Brief, p. 12). Assuming 
arguendo that this claim is true a total circle of definitions 
has been reached. Section 35-4-S(a) states the following: 
The Commission shall in cooperation with 
the employer consider for the purposes of this 
Act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market 
in reaching a determination of whether the ineligi-
bility of a claimant is contrary to equity and 
good conscience. 
Thus, assuming the defendants' argument is correct the 
definition of equity and good conscience as limited by the 
statute itself is one of "reasonableness" and a continuing 
"attachment to the labor market." 
It is obvious, therefore, that the definitions of both 
"good cause" and "equity and good conscience" are identical. 
Seemingly, a person who is reasonable in quitting his employ-
ment would have good cause for such quitting and it would not 
be contrary to equity and good conscience to allow him bene-
fits. Conversely, a person who is unreasonable in quitting 
his job and who has no genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market would not have good cause for quitting nor 
would it be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose 
a disqualification. 
-8-
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The decision of the Board, however, when paraphrased 
in light of its findings would be as follows: The claimant 
was criticized by her supervisor before conducting training 
sessions and was denied a transfer to another assignment for 
which she was experienced solely because the supervisor of 
the new unit would have been a friend of the claimant's. It 
was not reasonable for claimant to leave her employment and 
therefore there is not good cause for termination. However, 
the criticism by her supervisor and the denial of transfer 
was a reasonable basis for the claimant to leave work and 
this, together with the fact she immediately commenced a 
search for work upon leaving her employment requires that 
benefits be paid since to do otherwise would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience. 
As is patent on its face, the actions of the claimant 
cannot be both reasonable and unreasonable at the same time 
thereby requiring denial of the benefits because of their 
unreasonableness but reinstating the benefits because of their 
reasonableness. 
The defendants admit that the "equity and good conscience" 
language is not found in any other statutes in the country 
and therefore requests that this Court examine the legislative 
history of the passage of this act. While it is no doubt 
relevant to examine legislative history Plaintiff does not 
-9-
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believe that the defendants have produced relevant testimony 
or documents germane to such history. 
Whatever lobbying efforts took place on behalf of the 
advisory council or whatever opinions were given by the Depart-
ment of Employment Security as to the interpretation of the 
proposed legislation is irrelevant in determining legislative 
intent. Murphy v. Nilsen, 527 P.2d 736 {Ore. App. 1974). 
Likewise, any statements made by Defendants' counsel during 
hearings is not relevant to legislative history. Henthorn v. 
Grand Prairie School District No. 14, 601 P.2d 1243 {Ore. 1979). 
It is well settled that statements by legislators or even 
committee reports do not necessarily reflect the purpose 
which the majority of legislators believed was being carried 
out by the passage of a statute. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 
433 P.2d 220 {Hawaii 1967). 
It is interesting to note from the purported legislative 
history that the defendants' own administrator acknowledged 
that "good cause" was still to be determined by the definitions 
of this Court. {Appendix 2 of Defendants' Brief). On the 
other hand, however, Defendants argue that the term "reasonable" 
cannot have the same meaning under the equity and good conscience 
provision as it does under the "good cause" standard since 
there would have been no need for the exception to be negotiated 
by the labor and management representatives on the advisory 
-10-
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council unless the definitions were different. 
Brief, p. 11). 
(Defendants' 
Whatever may have been the hopes of the advisory council 
or the purposes of the lobbyists in sponsoring the bill, the 
fact remains that the present statute incorporates both the 
term "good cause" and specifically defines "equity and good 
conscience'' in the act itself. Whereas under the prior act 
the Commission was given discretion in assessing the penalty 
of a claimant who failed to quit with good cause, i.e., whether 
the claimant would be penalized one to six weeks with no benefits. 
The new law specifically provides no such unlimited discretion 
on penalty but merely states the criteria to be used in deter-
mining initial liability. 
Thus, whereas under the prior law the Cormnission could 
have found Mrs. Petersen to have quit with no just cause but 
could have decided to only penalize her for one week period. 
The present law requires the Commission to either grant her 
full benefits (by finding that she quit with cause and that 
benefits should be extended to her in equity and good conscience) 
or to deny all benefits to her (finding she quit without cause 
and that denial of benefits is equitable and conscionable) . 
Thus, the same standard of determining "causation" also deter-
mines the "penalty" that the claimant will receive. There is 
no longer a provision allowing a partial penalty to a person 
-11-
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quitting without good cause. 
In summary, if the statute as written is to be harmonized 
at all the terms "equity and good conscience" must be used in 
conjunction with findings of good cause and not in an attempt 
to establish a second standard. To do so produces an absurd 
consequence as in this case where the Board of Review finds 
the same actions of the claimant to be both reasonable and 
unreasonable at the same time. It is a cardinal rule of 
construction that statutes should not be applied to lead to 
incongruous results which were never intended by the Legisla-
ture. Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). The statute 
must be given reasonable and sensible construction to prevent 
such absurd consequences. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 
575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). 
The sole standard that should be raised on appeals such 
as this is the reasonableness of the claimant's actions and 
the claimant's continuing attachment to the work force. In 
such a case if the Board finds the actions of the claimant 
reasonable and finds a continuing attachment to the work force 
an employer can only appeal if he believes the evidence does 
not justify that decision. If, on the other hand, the Board 
finds the actions to be unreasonable or finds no attachment 
to the work force the employee would then have to decide 
whether the evidences justifies the decision. The arguments 
-12-
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raised, for example, in Point V of the Defendants' Brief 
would be properly addressed to this Court were the evidence 
being attacked. 
The present interpretation of the Board, however, . lS 
illogical and contrary to law. It is impossible for the Board 
to justify its decision that no good cause is present by 
showing that the claimant was unreasonable or showed no con-
tinuing attachment to the work force and then, at the same 
time, decide that the same circumstances show a reasonableness 
of the actions of the claimant and a continuing attachment to 
the work force justifying the equitable and good conscience 
exception which they claim exists to the good cause standard. 
There can be only one determination of benefits based upon 
the criteria established by this Court and by the agency 
itself. Whether the terms be called "good cause", "equity 
and good conscience", or "kinetic streams of awareness" (or 
any other term the interpreter desires) the criteria used 
to define these terms must be uniform and must be in conformity 
to this Court's prior decisions and the rules of the agency 
itself. 
To allow anything other than this type of interpretation 
creates only chaos, confusion, and a breakdown of all standards 
of the unemployment system. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, this Court should 
affirm the findings of the Appeals Referee and of the Board 
of Review finding no "good cause" for the termination of 
claimant's employment and should deny claimant all benefits 
or, in the alternative, should remand this matter to the 
Board of Review for the purpose of reconsideration in light 
of one and only one appropriate standard of consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ByM.~ G~Mham 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
St. Benedict's Hospital 
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